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Abstract—Online advertisers, third party trackers and analyt-
ics services are constantly tracking user activities as they access
web services through their web browsers or mobile apps. While,
web browser plugins disabling and blocking Ads (often associated
tracking/analytics scripts), e.g. AdBlock Plus[3] have been well
studied and are relatively well understood, an emerging new
category of apps in the tracking mobile eco-system, referred as
the mobile Ad-Blocking apps, received very little to no attention.
With the recent significant increase of the number of mobile
Ad-Blockers and the exponential growth of mobile Ad-Blocking
apps’ popularity, this paper aims to fill in the gap and study this
new category of players in the mobile ad/tracking eco-system.
This paper presents the first study of Android Ad-Blocking
apps (or Ad-Blockers), analysing 97 Ad-Blocking mobile apps
extracted from a corpus of more than 1.5 million Android apps
on Google Play. While the main (declared) purpose of the apps
is to block advertisements and mobile tracking services, our data
analysis revealed the paradoxical presence of third-party tracking
libraries and permissions to access sensitive resources on users’
mobile devices, as well as the existence of embedded malware
code within some mobile Ad-Blockers. We also analysed user
reviews and found that even though a fraction of users raised
concerns about the privacy and the actual performance of the
mobile Ad-Blocking apps, most of the apps still attract a relatively
high rating.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online advertising is ubiquitous in today’s digital economy.
Embedded third-party tracking libraries in websites and mo-
bile applications (apps in short) is common and perform a
variety of functions ranging from enhancing user experience,
social sharing to the monetisation of services by enabling
targeted and location-based advertisements. Such integration
has evolved into a tangled eco-system illustrated by the top10K
Alexa websites each integrating on average more than 30
different third-party tracking services for user profiling and ad-
vertisement purposes [25]. Likewise, the popularity of mobile
apps resulted into a thriving mobile tracking and advertising
ecosystem that is perhaps more privacy-invasive, due to the
ubiquitous nature of the mobile apps usage.
Sensitive user data, including contacts, locations, SMS
and web history is readily accessible on mobile devices for
apps geared with the relevant permissions, and represent a
valuable asset for third-party advertisers and trackers, which
in turn poses serious privacy and security risks beyond the
discomfort that mobile ads displayed on rather small screens of
smartphones might generate. Naturally, the mobile apps eco-
system has recently witnessed the emergence of a new class
of Ad-blocking1 tools, packaged as mobile apps, in popular
mobile app stores such as Google Play.
This paper presents the first characterisation study of An-
droid mobile Ad-Blocking apps with a focus on security
and privacy offered by these apps. In particular, we analyse
the Android permissions mobile Ad-Blockers request and we
perform static analysis of the code to investigate the presence
of malware and third party tracking libraries.
We collect and extract from a corpus of more than 1.5
million Android apps, 97 mobile apps for which the name or
the description suggest they enable to either block ads or to
block trackers. We then manually check that the apps actually
fall into the category of Ad-Blocking apps (cf. Section II).
We use a set of tools to decompile the Ad-Blocking apps and
analyse the source code of each of the mobile Ad-Blockers.
We then inspect the apps to reveal the presence of third-
party tracking libraries and sensitive permissions for critical
resources on users’ mobile devices. According to VirusTotal2’s
classification, we observe instances of Ad-Blockers using
excessive advertising, displaying full-screen advertisements
windows and embedding malware in the source code (cf.
Section III).
This paper makes the following major contributions:
• Mobile Ad-Blockers identification and taxonomy: We
investigate a dataset of 1,554,253 Android apps on
Google Play and identify 97 Ad-Blocking apps. Based
on the intended functionality and an inspection of the
code, we provide a generic taxonomy of Ad-Blockers
depending on the mechanisms used to block ads and the
(corresponding) tracking/analytics services.
• Third-party user tracking: We perform static analysis
on mobile Ad-Blockers’ source code. We observe that,
albeit Ad-Blocking apps’ claims to block ads and prevent
tracking, 68% of them still embed third-party tracking
and ads libraries in their code, potentially leaking per-
sonal information to third-parties. We also observe that
24% display ads.
• Sensitive Permissions Access: Our analysis reveal that
89% of the Ad-Blockers request sensitive permissions to
access critical resources such as user contacts, accounts,
text messages, and user browsing history.
1We use the term Ad-Blocking to refer to apps blocking both ads
and tracking/analytics services.
2An Anti-virus (AV) tools conglomerate, https://virustotal.com
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• Malware presence and inefficiency of Ad-Blockers:
According to VirusTotal scan reports, 13% of the Ad-
Blockers have malware presence in their source code with
instances of spyware and adware to spy on users’ be-
haviour. We analyse user reviews on Google Play to sense
whether users expressed concerns about the security, the
privacy, and the inefficiency–in term of not blocking ads
and trackers–of the Ad-Blockers. Our analysis reveals that
albeit users have publicly raised concerns in their app
reviews yet some of the Ad-Blockers have high ratings
and a significant number of installs.
II. CHARACTERIZING AD-BLOCKERS ON GOOGLE PLAY
We first briefly introduce mechanisms used by Mobile Ad-
Blocking apps to block trackers and ads. Then, we describe
our method for identifying Ad-Blockers on Google Play and
show our characterisation of the collected Ad-Blockers.
1) Android Ad-Blocking Mechanisms: Third-party advertis-
ers and trackers use HTTP(s) to deliver Ads to end users. Ad-
Blockers intercept and filter ads- and tracking-related traffic.
To this end, Ad-Blockers can employ filters either as browsers’
extensions (add-ons) or as a built-in functionality (Case 1 in
Figure 1) to block ads and trackers from the traffic generated
while the user (or associated app) accesses the Internet. Ad-
blockers can also implement mechanisms such as virtual
private networks (VPN) tunnels3 to intercept and filter ads-
related traffic, either locally on mobile devices (Case 2 in
Figure 1) or on remote servers (Case 3 in Figure 1), from
all installed apps.
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Fig. 1: Overview of Android’s Ad-Blocking mechanisms:
(1) brower-level Ad-Blocking–browser with built-in functions
or add-ons to block third-party advertisements and trackers
on browsed webpages, (2) system-level local Ad-Blocking–
specialized Android apps which intercept all installed apps’
traffic and filter-out advertisements and trackers, (3) system-
level remote Ad-Blocking–specialized Android apps which
forward user traffic to dedicated servers for Ad-Blocking.
2) Dataset in Use: In order to identify as many Ad-
Blockers as possible on Google Play, we implemented a
Google Play crawler that takes advantage of two complemen-
tary seeds. First, we start with the top 100 apps for four Google
3https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/
VpnService.html
Play categories likely to contain Ad-Blockers: Tools, Commu-
nication, Personality, and Productivity. Second, we use Google
Play’s search feature to find apps containing Ad-Blocking-
related keywords. The keywords used are: “Ad-Block” (and
variants including “ads block”, “ad block”, “ads-blocking”,
“blocking-ads” etc.), and “privacy”, “tracking-free”, “Anti-
tracking” in their app descriptions. Our crawler follows a
breadth-first-search approach for any other app considered as
“similar” by Google Play and for other apps published by the
same developer. In total, we surveyed 1,554,253 apps for a
4-week period in December 2016.
Android apps are typically written in Java code (and pos-
sibly with some additional native code). The overall Java
code–implementing the intended functionality and third-party
library for extended service or feature–is compiled to a
.dex file, containing compressed bytecode that runs in the
Dalvik virtual machine. Android apps are distributed on mar-
ketplaces such as Google Play store as .apk files, which
bundle the .dex code with the app’s specification file named
AndroidManifest.xml. To download the apps’ .apk
files (aka APKs) and other apps’ metadata from Google Play
(e.g., app description, number of installs, developer infor-
mation, user reviews and app rating), we use Google Play
Unofficial Python API [14] for free apps and the Raccoon APK
Downloader for paid apps [18]. Finally, we use ApkTool and
dex2jar to decompile and extract each app’s source code
and the corresponding AndroidManifest.xml.
We identified a total of 97 Ad-Blockers (87 free and 10
paid apps) that match one or more relevant keywords in their
app description. We manually checked their description to
ensure they do belong to what users would consider as an
Ad-Blocking tool or alternatively a tool to block tracking.
For a baseline comparison (cf. Section III), we also collected
500 randomly selected free non-Ad-Blocking apps–collected
from Tools, Communication, Personality, and Productivity
categories–from Google Play. In order to further analyse ad-
blockers and reproduce our findings, the dataset and crawling
scripts are available upon request.
3) The Rise of Android Ad-Blockers: We start our anal-
ysis by observing the increase of Ad-Blockers available for
download on Google Play over time. Given that Google Play
does not report the actual release date of the apps but their last
update, we use the date of their first review as a proxy of their
release date. For those Ad-Blockers without user reviews, we
approximate the release date with the date of their last update.
Figure 2a shows the steady increase of Ad-Blocking apps
listed on Google Play. During the 3-year period that spans
between August 2012 and August 2015, the number of Ad-
Blocking apps increased 3-fold. Overall, the analysed Ad-
Blockers receive high user ratings: 41% of the Ad-Blockers
have more than 100K installs and 68% of them have at least a
4-star rating as shown in Figure 2b. We cannot tell whether the
installs and the reviews are legitimate or if those ratings were
actually acquired by the app developers, using apps’ promotion
services on underground marketplaces to promote the apps4.
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Fig. 2: Evolution of Ad-Blockers on Google Play: (a) Number
of Ad-Blockers available on Google Play over time. (b)
Distribution of app rating vs. installs per Ad-Blocker.
Ad-Blockers’ Classification.
Given that Ad-Blockers block ads and trackers in a different
fashion, we aim at categorising Ad-Blockers according to
their intended functionality (or complementary features) and
their Ad-Blocking mechanism. Unfortunately, Google Play’s
app categories (e.g., Tools and Communication) are too broad
to capture the actual purpose and functionality of the app.
Moreover, apps may not include any detail on their Ad-
Blocking mechanisms in their descriptions on Google Play.
To identify Ad-Blocking mechanisms of the analysed Ad-
Blockers, we manually tested and categorised them into two
classes, listed in Table I.
App Category % of Apps (N = 97)
Browser-level Ad-Blockers 86%
System-level or VPN-based Ad-Blockers 14%
TABLE I: Classification of Ad-Blockers (see Table IX for
details).
We found that 86% of the analysed Ad-Blockers(cf. Ta-
ble IX) have built-in Ad-Blocking mechanism to block ads
and trackers on a given webpage. These Ad-Blockers do not
block In-App ads or Ad-banners (cf. Case (ii) in Figure 3). On
4https://www.seoclerk.com/Link-Building/192193/Test-Your-iOS-
or-Android-Apps-On-Smartphone-And-Provide-Review-And-Rating
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Fig. 3: Overview of ads displayed in Android apps. Here,
an app accesses, step 1, first-party webpage. Depending upon
third-party libraries embedded in app’s source code and third-
party JavaScript programs included in the webpage’s HTML
source code, the app sends additional requests, step 2, to third-
party ad services. The app displays ads from third-party ad
services either in In-App Ads-banner, Case ii, in a browsed
webpage, Case i, or both.
the other hand, 14% of the apps create local or remote VPN-
tunnel for blocking ads-related traffic, whether ads appeared
in ad-banners or in a browsed webpage (cf. Case (i) & (ii) in
Figure 3), from all installed apps.
Geographical Distribution of Ad-Blockers.
Here, we are interested in characterising the distribution and
the popularity of Ad-Blockers per country and per geographi-
cal regions. To this end, we rely on the geographical popularity
or rank data from AppAnnie [7]. AppAnnie offers downloads
or installs analytics to apps’ developers and gathers apps’
longitudinal usage from app markets such Google Play and
iTunes. It uses developers’ accounts to tracks apps’ downloads
from app markets and assigns numeric values or ranks to
represent apps’ popularity in each geographical region or
country. For each Ad-Blocker, we use AppAnnie API to obtain
rank values per country. From the collected rank data, we map
Ad-Blockers to countries and count the number of distinct Ad-
Blockers per country. Moreover, we measure the median ranks
to determine the popularity of Ad-Blockers per country.
Figure 4 shows the cumulative distribution of the number of
countries with the number of distinct Ad-Blockers according
to AppAnnie countries rank dataset. We observe a significant
difference in the geographical coverage among the classes of
Ad-Blockers. The distribution suggests that paid Ad-Blockers
have more geographically scattered downloads around the
globe: 80% of paid Ad-Blockers have downloads in more
than 20 countries where as the 56% of the free counterparts
have their users located in less than 20 different countries.
The figure also reveals that browser-level Ad-Blockers have
a higher geographical coverage in terms of installs when
compared to systems-level or VPN-based Ad-Blockers.
We also observe a significant difference in the number
of Ad-Blockers per geographical region. Several countries
including China, Macedonia, and Lativa have diverse set
of free Ad-Blockers–each has 56% of distinct Ad-Blockers.
Maxthon Browser, a browser-based free Ad-Blocker, has more
than 10M installs in 93 different countries, suggesting its
global popularity. On the other hand Piggy Browser, also a free
Ad-Blocker, has 1K installs only in a single country, Japan.
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Fig. 4: Geographical usage (or installs) of Ad-Blockers.
The number of Ad-Blockers per country does not reveal
the actual popularity of Ad-Blockers per country. We further
analyse the popularity of each Ad-Blocker per country by
measuring the median rank of all Ad-Blockers per coun-
try. Figure 5 shows the median rank of the analysed Ad-
Blockers. Notably, VPN-based Ad-Blockers are more popular
in countries such as China (median rank = 106), Macau
(141), Saudi Arabia (152) and Oman (161) whereas browser-
based Ad-Blockers are popular in France (125), Ukraine (132),
and Germany(145). Compared to free Ad-Blockers, paid Ad-
Blockers are popular in Taiwan (65), Spain (70), and Japan
(70). When considering the median ranks of all Ad-Blockers
per country, we observe that Ad-Blockers are popular in
France (149), Russia (170), and Germany (176).
III. ANALYSIS OF AD-BLOCKERS
In this section, we analyse the source code of the Ad-
Blockers using static analysis. We examine the filter lists
used by the Ad-Blockers and investigate the Ad-Blockers
requesting sensitive permissions. Further, we evaluate the Ad-
Blockers for the presence of third-party ads and tracking
libraries, embedded in their code, and study their malware
activities using VirusTotal. Finally, we present our analysis
of Ad-Blockers’ reviews on Google Play and report on users
concerns about potential security and privacy issues as well as
the inefficiency of Ad-Blockers.
Ad-Blockers
# Filter Lists Paid Free All
1 70% 84% 82%
2 30% 8% 10%
≥3 0% 8% 8%
TABLE II: Distribution of filter lists used by the analysed Ad-
Blockers.
A. Filter Lists in Use
Ad-Blockers usually employ filter lists (e.g. Black lists)
either downloaded locally or present on a remote server to
block (or allow) third-party ads and tracking services. The
(a) All Ad-Blockers
(b) Paid Ad-Blockers (c) Free Ad-Blockers
(d) System-level(VPN-based) Ad-
Blockers
(e) Browser-level Ad-Blockers
Fig. 5: An overview of Ad-Blockers’ popularity per country.
The lower values of median rank, dark red colour, represent
that Ad-Blockers are more popular in the corresponding geo-
graphical region or country .
decompilation of Ad-Blockers’ APKs allows us to reveal the
employed filter lists. Using Apktool, we first decompile the
Ad-Blockers’ APKs and then search for specific keywords in
the source code. The keywords include: “easylists”, “abp”,
“hosts”, “mvps”, “blacklist”, “blocklist”, “whitelist”, “excep-
tion rules”, and “acceptable ads”. Finally, for each Ad-Blocker,
we use JD-GUI to manually inspect the decompiled source
codes and to determine the employed filter lists.
In Table II, we observe that 82% of the analysed Ad-
Blockers contain only one filter list. While 18% of the Ad-
Blockers use a composition of several filter lists.
Table III shows the distribution of filter lists used by the
Ad-Blockers. 90% of the paid Ad-Blockers and 39% of the
free Ad-Blockers employ custom-built filter lists to block ads
and tracking related traffic. We found that 16% of the Ad-
Blockers use EasyList [9] to filter advertisements on a browsed
webpage. Our manual inspection of the code using ApkTool
and JD-GUI reveals that all VPN-based Ad-Blockers (cf.
Section II-1) such as F-Secure Freedome VPN and DashVPN
use their custom-built filters lists to block ads and trackers.
Ad-Blockers
Filter List Paid Free All Description
CustomizedList 90% 39% 42% Customized list for ads/trackers
EasyList [9] 0% 18% 16% Filter list of trackers/ads
hpHosts [15] 10% 10% 10% Filter list of ad/tracker/malicious hosts
AcceptableAdsRules [5] 0% 7% 7% List of non-intrusive, acceptable ads
MalwareHosts [16] 0% 5% 5% Filter list of malicious hosts
FanboySocial [13] 0% 4% 4% Filter list of social buttons/widgets
AntiAdblockRules [1] 0% 4% 4% Filters for evading anti-Adblock scripts
HostStevenBlack [20] 0% 3% 3% Filter list of ad/tracker/malicious hosts
EasyPrivacy [11] 0% 3% 3% Filter list of trackers/analytics
AdSweep [4] 0% 3% 3% List of Rules to hide ads on websites
EasyListChina [8] 0% 2% 2% EasyList tailored for Chinese websites
YoyoHosts [21] 0% 2% 2% Filter list of ad/tracker/malicious hosts
SomeOneCareHosts [19] 0% 1% 1% Filter list of ad/tracker/malicious hosts
MvpsHosts [17] 0% 1% 1% Blacklist of ad/tracker/malicious hosts
EasyListNEHide [10] 0% 1% 1% EasyList without element hiding rules
AdAwayHosts [2] 0% 1% 1% Filter list of mobile ad/tracker hosts
TABLE III: Distribution of all filter lists in the analysed Ad-
Blockers.
In particular, F-Secure Freedome VPN app blocks any traffic
associated with web and mobile tracking including Google
Ads, DoubleClick, and other popular tagging/analytics ser-
vices such as Google Tag and ComScore [12]. Moreover, 3%
of the Ad-Blockers such as Simple FLV and Fast Browser
inject JavaScript codes, AdSweep [4], to hide rather than block
ads on a browsed webpage.
B. Permission Analysis
We investigate how Ad-Blockers request Android
permissions to access sensitive system resources. For
each Ad-Blocker, we extract the requested permissions
by parsing uses-permission and service tags in the
AndroidManifest.xml. We exclude network-related
permissions like Internet access which are inherent to
Ad-Blockers.
Figure 6 compares the permissions requested by Ad-
Blockers with the baseline (cf. Dataset in Section II), which
we included for reference. We use the method-to-permission
mapping provided by Au et al. [22] to investigate the source-
code segments invoking the methods protected by each An-
droid permission. Our analysis reveals that Ad-Blocking apps
request access to permissions rarely requested by free non-
Ad-Blocking apps.
Apps such as Anti-virus apps request the READ_LOGS per-
mission to inspect other apps’ activities [6][27]. However, we
observe that Ad-Blockers like UC Browser and DU Browser
also request access to it. Android’s documentation [6] flags
the READ_LOGS permission as highly sensitive as app de-
velopers may carelessly misuse Android’s logging capabilities
and (unintentionally) expose personal information (including
passwords) to any other apps requesting it.
Several other permissions listed in Figure 6 and detailed
in Table IV appear unusual requirements for Ad-Blockers.
For each case, we manually checked the legitimacy of these
requests without finding a clear evidence of a deliberate
abuse of the granted permissions. However, we found that
spyware Ad-Blocking apps (which we further investigate in
Section III-D) request the READ_SMS permission to read
text messages whereas AV apps may use it to scan text
messages for possible malware presence. Similarly, apps re-
questing READ_CONTACTS incorporate functions in the likes
of blocking text and calls from specific phone numbers or
sharing features through SMS or email.
All Free Non-
Permission Ad-Blockers Ad-Blockers
ACCESS FINE LOCATION 63% 26%
READ HISTORY BOOKMARKS 47% 10%
GET ACCOUNTS 26% 38%
SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW 24% 24%
CAMERA 24% 24%
RECORD AUDIO 16% 14%
BIND VPN SERVICE 14% 0%
DOWNLOAD WITHOUT NOTIFICATION 10% 4%
READ LOGS 8% 2%
READ CONTACTS 5% 30%
READ CALL LOG 2% 13%
READ SMS 1% 16%
READ CONTACT 1% 16%
READ CALENDAR 1% 9%
TABLE IV: Privacy sensitive permissions requested by Ad-
Blockers.
C. Embedded Ads and Tracking Libraries
We examine the presence of embedded libraries for tracking
or advertising purposes in the source-code of each Ad-Blocker.
In order to conduct our analysis, we use ApkTool to decom-
pile each Ad-Blocker and perform a dictionary-based search
for ads and tracking libraries inside the decompiled source
code. We rely on [30] and compile a comprehensive dictionary
of 338 mobile tracking libraries.
Table V compares the number of ads and tracking libraries
used by Ad-Blocking apps with the presence of ads and
tracking libraries in the reference set of 500 free non-Ad-
Blocking apps. We observe that 68% of the Ad-Blocking apps
embed at least one third-party ads and tracking library in their
code. The penetration of tracking libraries in Ad-Blocking
apps is however significantly lower than in the reference set
of 500 non-Ad-Blocking apps with 84% of the latter having
at least one embedded tracking library.
Since Ad-Blockers intend to block trackers and (intrusive)
advertisements, the lower presence of tracking and adver-
tisement libraries is actually meaningful. Nevertheless, we
identified at least one targeted ads library in 68% of the
Ad-Blockers claiming (as mentioned in their apps description
on Google Play) to block advertisements. While paid apps
are often thought to be free from ads (as their business
model is supposedly not driven by advertising), we observed
a disturbing 60% of the paid Ad-Blockers having at least one
Ad-Blockers Free
# Trackers Paid Free All non-Ad-Blocking Apps
0 40% 31% 32% 16%
1 50% 14% 18% 7%
2 10% 13% 12% 13%
3 0% 10% 9% 16%
4 0% 11% 10% 14%
≥5 0% 21% 19% 34%
TABLE V: Analysis of third party ads and tracking libraries
in Ad-Blockers and free non-Ad-Blocking apps.
025
50
75
W
RI
TE
_E
XT
ER
NA
L_
ST
OR
AG
E
AC
CE
SS
_F
IN
E_
LO
CA
TI
ON
RE
AD
_E
XT
ER
NA
L_
ST
OR
AG
E
W
RI
TE
_S
ET
TI
NG
S
RE
AD
_P
HO
NE
_S
TA
TE
RE
AD
_H
IS
TO
RY
_B
OO
KM
AR
KS
RE
CE
IV
E_
BO
OT
_C
OM
PL
ET
ED
CH
IL
D_
SE
RV
IC
E
GE
T_
AC
CO
UN
TS
AC
CE
SS
_C
OA
RS
E_
LO
CA
TI
ON
RE
AD
_S
ET
TI
NG
S
W
RI
TE
_H
IS
TO
RY
_B
OO
KM
AR
KS
SY
ST
EM
_A
LE
RT
_W
IN
DO
W
GE
T_
TA
SK
S
CA
M
ER
A
BI
LL
IN
G
RE
AD
_C
ON
TA
CT
S
RE
CO
RD
_A
UD
IO
US
E_
CR
ED
EN
TI
AL
S
BI
ND
_V
PN
_S
ER
VI
CE
M
AN
AG
E_
AC
CO
UN
TS
NF
C
M
OD
IF
Y_
AU
DI
O_
SE
TT
IN
GS
DO
W
NL
OA
D_
W
IT
HO
UT
_N
OT
IF
IC
AT
IO
N
RE
AD
_L
OG
S
CO
NT
EN
TB
LO
CK
ER
M
OU
NT
_U
NM
OU
NT
_F
IL
ES
YS
TE
M
S
AU
TH
EN
TI
CA
TE
_A
CC
OU
NT
S
KI
LL
_B
AC
KG
RO
UN
D_
PR
OC
ES
SE
S
RE
AD
_P
RO
FI
LE
RE
ST
AR
T_
PA
CK
AG
ES
CH
AN
GE
_W
IF
I_
M
UL
TI
CA
ST
_S
TA
TE
PE
R_
AC
CO
UN
T_
TY
PE
AC
CE
SS
_D
OW
NL
OA
D_
M
AN
AG
ER
IN
TE
RA
CT
_A
CR
OS
S_
US
ER
S_
FU
LL
AC
CE
SS
_P
RO
VI
DE
R
W
RI
TE
_H
IS
TO
RY
_B
OO
KM
AR
K
RE
AD
_W
RI
TE
_B
OO
KM
AR
K_
FO
LD
ER
S
BI
ND
_Q
UI
CK
_S
ET
TI
NG
S_
TI
LE
GE
T_
PR
EI
NS
TA
LL
_D
AT
A
%
 o
f A
pp
s
All Ad−Blocking Apps Free Ad−Blocking Apps Free non−Ad−Blocking Apps Paid Ad−Blocking Apps
Fig. 6: Detailed comparison of Android permissions (x-axis) requested by Ad-Blocking and free non-Ad-Blocking apps.
0
10
20
30
40
Go
oge
Ad
s
Fac
ebo
ok
Sq
uar
eup
Go
ogl
eA
nal
ytic
s
No
stra
Git
hub
Ste
rics
on
Ap
psf
lye
r
Flu
rry
Go
ogl
eco
de
Cra
shl
ytic
s
Am
azo
n
Ve
wp
age
rind
ica
tor
Mo
pub
Sta
rta
pp
Ac
tion
bar
she
rloc
k
InM
obi
Fas
ter
xm
l
Ten
ce
nt
Dro
pbo
x
Ch
art
boo
st
Bu
mp
Tec
h
Loo
pj
Ho
cke
yap
p
Jirb
o
Ap
pbo
y
Ba
idu
Mix
pan
el
Mil
len
nia
lMe
dia
Um
eng
Tw
itte
r
Ad
justJcra
ft
Un
ity3
d
Ad
ma
rve
l
Ap
pbr
ain
Ap
sal
ar
Am
azo
nA
WS
He
yza
p
Alip
ay
Pu
sh
Su
per
son
icA
ds
Co
ms
cor
e
Nu
anc
e
Qu
ant
cas
t
Ae
rse
rv
Ap
ptim
ize
Me
tap
s
Pe
rk
Qu
alc
om
m
%
 o
f A
pp
s
All Ad−Blocking Apps Free Ad−Blocking Apps Free non−Ad−Blocking Apps Paid Ad−Blocking Apps
Fig. 7: Third-party libraries (x-axis) in Ad-Blocking and free non-Ad-Blocking apps.
embedded third-party ad and tracking library. In particular,
Photon Flash Player & Browser and Perk Browser–two popu-
lar apps, which combined have more than 11M installs– have
the highest number of embedded third-party tracking libraries:
13 and 11 tracking libraries respectively. In general, 19% of
the Ad-Blockers have at least five third-party ads and tracking
libraries.
Figure 7 ranks the trackers in all analysed Ad-Blocking
apps. Google Ads and Facebook social analytics are the most
popular ones among our corpus of Ad-Blockers. A closer
examination at the long-tail of the distribution reveals that
the least popular third-party tracking libraries are more com-
mon in Ad-Blockers than in free non-Ad-Blocking apps. For
instance, Ad-Blockers like Opera Browser and DU Browser,
each has over 10M installs, integrate libraries like Appboy5
and Tencent6 for tracking and delivering targeted ads.
D. Malware Analysis
We explore the presence of malware in the analysed Ad-
Blockers. In order to effectively identify any malware activity
on mobile apps, it is critical to rely on multiple malware
scanning tools as malicious components may be designed to
circumvent some AV tools and malware scanners. To improve
the confidence of our malware scans, we rely on VirusTotal,
an online service that aggregates the scanning capabilities
provided by multiple AV tools.
5https://www.appboy.com
6http://tencent.com/en-us/ps/adservice.shtml
# App ID Price Rating Installs AV-rank DevLoc
1 Deep Search Browser Free 2.6 1K 10 PK
2 sFly Network Booster Free 4.3 1K 10 CN
3 Faster Browser Ever Free 4.0 1K 6 RU
4 FastCat Free 4.5 100 6 AE
5 Magneto Browser Free 4.0 100 4 IN
6 Adskip Browser Free 2.0 5K 4 CN
7 Maxthon Browser Free 4.4 10M 3 CN
TABLE VI: Ad-Blockers with a VirusTotal AV-rank ≥ 3. De-
vLoc represents the geolocation of Ad-Blockers’ developers.
We automate our malware scanning process by using Virus-
Total’s public API. After completing the scan, VirusTotal
generates a report that indicates which of the participating
AV scanning tools detected any malware activity in the app
and the corresponding malware signature (if any). Given
that a scanning tool may produce false positives, we rely
on the “AV-rank” metric (i.e., the number of affiliated AV
tools that identified any malware activity) to reason about the
maliciousness of an Ad-Blocker. We consider an “AV-rank”
threshold≥ 3 as a signal for malware presence in Ad-Blockers.
Additionally, we glean developers’ metadata from Google Play
and AppAnnie to investigate the geolocations of developers of
malicious Ad-Blockers.
Table VI lists the Ad-Blocking apps ranked by their AV-
rank. We include developers’ geolocation and apps’ Google
Play rating and the number of installs for each app for
reference. 21% of the analysed Ad-Blocking apps have at least
one positive malware report according to VirusTotal with 7%
of the Ad-Blockers have an “AV-rank” above our threshold.
The malware signatures correspond to five different classes of
Complaint Category % of negative reviews (N = 20, 008)
1 Star Reviews 13,764
2 Star Reviews 6,244
Allowing/not-blocking Ads 16%
Bugs & battery life 7%
Abusive permissions 1.5%
Malware/fraud reports 0.65%
TABLE VII: Classification of negative reviews for Ad-
Blockers in Google Play.
malware: Adware (22%), Trojan (23%), Malvertising (16%),
and Riskware (39%). We observe that malware developers are
located in Russia and Asian countries such as India, China,
Pakistan, and United Arab Emirates.
Next, we analyse the permission-protected API access of the
malicious Ad-Blockers. Maxthon Browser incorporates Ad-
ware on its source-code and requests the intrusive SYSTEM_-
ALERT_WINDOW permission which allows the Maxthon
Browser to draw window alerts (e.g., full screen Ad windows)
on top of any other active app. Likewise, DU Browser, which
incorporates Riskware elements according to VirusTotal, re-
quires the READ_LOGS, READ_PHONE_STATE, READ_-
HISTORY_BOOKMARKS, READ_SETTINGS, and WRITE_-
SETTINGS permissions to read users’ settings, hijack book-
marks, change browser’s start page, and link web searches to
potentially lower ranked sites.
E. Apps Reviews Analysis
We use negative users comments to capture the perceptions
and concerns about the Ad-Blocking functionality of the
analysed Ad-Blockers. Our reasoning to focus our analysis on
negative reviews, 1- and 2-star reviews appeared on Google
Play, for popular apps is that any serious Ad-Blocking-related
concern exposed by a user should receive a negative review.
To better identify whether users publicly report any Ad-
Blocking concerns after using each Ad-Blocker, we analyse
(with manual supervision) the content of 20,008 negative
reviews for 88% of the analysed Ad-Blockers7. We label
the app reviews into the 4 categories listed in Table VII
which cover from performance concerns and bugs to different
types of Ad-Blocking concerns as well as abusive or intrusive
permission requests. We exclude from our analysis any reviews
related with usability concerns such as bugs and crashes. Note
that 7% of the complaints are about bugs, crashes and other
performance aspects such as bugs and battery-life overhead.
We observe that 16% of the negative reviews report on the
allowing or displaying ads in In-App Ad-banner or visited
websites (cf. Figure 3). We found that 77% of the analysed
Ad-Blockers have at least one negative review about their
inefficiency to block ads. We manually check the negatively
reviewed apps and found that 24% of the apps show ads and
display full-screen advertisements (e.g., Figure 8).
Notably, 1.5% of the negative reviews report on the in-
trusiveness and sensitive permissions requests of 37% of the
analysed Ad-Blockers. We found that these 37% Ad-Blockers
712% of the Ad-Blockers do not have negative reviews or do not
have reviews at all.
(a) (b)
Fig. 8: Screenshots showing inefficiency of DashVPN, a
system-level Ad-Blocker: (a) DashVPN does not block click-
baits from Taboola (taboola.com) and (b) shows full-
screen ads from Google.
have at least one third-party ads and tracking library embedded
in their code (as per the analysis in Section III-C). Moreover,
we observed that 130 (' 0.65%) of the reviews explicitly
report malware or fraudulent activity in 22% of the analysed
Ad-Blockers, listed in Table VIII. Six of the apps reported
as malicious by end users are also considered as malicious
by VirusTotal (cf. Section III-D). Interestingly however, and
despite the presence of some awareness and public comments
about the potential security and privacy issues of Ad-Blockers,
these apps still exhibit relatively high average ratings and a
significant number of installs (cf. Table VIII). Our analysis
suggests that a significant number of Ad-Blockers do not fulfil
their main “intended” Ad-Blocking functionality.
# App Class NR-Ratio Rating Installs AV-positive
1 UC Browser - Fast Download Free 32% 4.5 100M 3
2 Opera browser - latest news Free 15% 4.3 100M
3 Yandex Browser for Android Free 12% 4.5 10M 3
4 Maxthon Browser - Fast&Secure Free 21% 4.4 10M 3
5 Photon Flash Player & Browser Free 28% 3.7 10M
6 CM Browser - Fast & Light Free 15% 4.5 50M
7 Dolphin - Best Web Browser Free 25% 4.5 50M
8 Adblock Browser for Android Free 26% 4.1 5M 3
9 APUS Browser - Fast Download Free 22% 4.5 5M 3
10 Free Adblocker Browser Free 8% 4.4 1M
11 Dolphin Jetpack - Fast & Flash Free 31% 4.1 1M
12 F-Secure Freedome VPN Free 11% 4.3 1M
13 Dolphin Zero Incognito Browser Free 17% 4.2 1M
14 Adblock Plus (Samsung Browser) Free 37% 3.9 500K
15 Mercury Browser for Android Free 19% 4.3 500K
16 Ghostery Privacy Browser Free 21% 4.1 500K
17 Rocket Browser Free 18% 4.4 100K
18 AC Browser Free 6% 4.5 100K
19 NetGuard - no-root firewall Free 19% 4.2 100K
20 Dee Browser Free 9% 4.1 50K 3
TABLE VIII: List of Ad-Blockers that are considered as
malicious by users in Google Play reviews and by VirusTotal
(AV-positive column). For each Ad-Blocker, the NR-Ratio
represents the ratio of the number of negative users’ comments
to the total number of all users’ comments.
IV. RELATED WORK
The Web has evolved, with increase in the prevalence and
complexity of tracking mechanisms since 1996, into a tangled
mass of third-party tracking domains embedded into first-party
webpages [29]. Research studies have reveal that the top 5%
of webpages embed 100 third party domains [32]. Among
other services such as provision of multimedia services via
content delivery networks and user-interactions, these third
parties provide a variety of services such as tracking users,
serving ads, and performing site analytics. Notably, the Alexa’s
top 10K websites have an average 34 third-party tracking and
advertisement services [25].
Several studies highlighted the privacy risks associated with
Android apps over-requesting Android permissions for third-
party tracking, advertising and analytic services [30] using
techniques like static analysis [22], taint analysis [24], and OS
modifications [28]. Previous research also adapted techniques
for malware detection such as signature analysis [23] to the
mobile context in order to identify potential malicious activity
of mobile apps. Using static code and dynamic analysis
techniques, Ikram et al., [27] measured mobile VPN apps
and identified several security and privacy issues in 283
different VPN permission-enabled Android apps. The authors
also highlighted an alarming mismatch in apps’ descriptions
on Google Play and their actual functionalities.
Studies have examined the effectiveness of web Ad-
Blockers [31] [26]. Ikram et al., [26] evaluated the effective-
ness of five different web Ad-Blocking plugins and proposed
an improved machine-learning based solution to strike the
balance between blocking tracking/advertising domains and
allowing domains that serve useful content such as CDNs.
Wills and Uzunoglu [32], investigated the default and fully
configured settings of Ad-Blocking plugins. They observed
that the default as well as the fully configured settings, with
composite filter lists, of the plugins are inefficient to block ads-
and tracking-related traffic. In contrast to the previous work,
this paper present the first characterisation study of mobile Ad-
Blocking apps with a focus on security and privacy offered by
these apps.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The increasing number of mobile Ad-Blockers available on
apps’ markets such as Google Play and the growing number
of complaints raised by users indicate serious ineffectiveness
or usability issues thus necessitate the urge to analyse this
unexplored eco-system. The average mobile user rates Ad-
Blockers positively even when they have malware presence.
According to our study, 16% of negative reviews are related
to (or concerned with) the ineffectiveness of the Ad-Blockers
suggesting serious performance issues. Moreover, our analysis
of Ad-Blockers, reviewed by users, reveals that several Ad-
Blockers such as F-Secure Freedome VPN caused several
usability issues while running other installed apps or surfing
the web. We believe that our work could be extended to study
the ineffectiveness of the Ad-Blockers. As a future work, we
plan to complement the insights provided by our analysis
with a comprehensive set of active tests to reveal the runtime
behavioural aspects of the Ad-Blockers. In essence, we aim to
device a testbed to analyse the Ad-Blockers’ in-effectiveness,
to validate their data- and energy-saving claims, and to eval-
uate their resilience against anti-Ad-Blocking JavaScripts on
the Web.
REFERENCES
[1] AakList (Anti-Adblock Killer). https://github.com/reek/anti-
adblock-killer/blob/master/anti-adblock-killer-filters.txt.
[2] AdAway Hosts. https://adaway.org/hosts.txt.
[3] Adblock Plus Plugin. https://adblockplus.org.
[4] AdSweep. https://web.archive.org/web/
20121126071410/http://www.adsweep.org/.
[5] Allow non-intrusive advertising. https://easylist-
downloads.adblockplus.org/exceptionrules.txt.
[6] Android Permissions. http://developer.android.com/guide/topics
/security/permissions.html.
[7] App Annie Insights. https://www.appannie.com/en/insights/.
[8] China+EasyList. https://easylist-
downloads.adblockplus.org/easylistchina+easylist.txt.
[9] EasyList. https://easylist.to/easylist/easylist.txt.
[10] EasyList Without Element Hiding Rules. https://easylist-
downloads.adblockplus.org/easylist noelemhide.txt.
[11] EasyPrivacy. https://easylist.to/easylist/easyprivacy.txt.
[12] F-Secure Freedome Anti-Tracking Feature Explained.
https://community.f-secure.com/t5/F-Secure/F-Secure-
Freedome-Anti-Tracking/ta-p/52153.
[13] Fanboy’s Social Blocking List. https://easylist-
downloads.adblockplus.org/fanboy-social.txt.
[14] Google Play Unofficial Python API.
https://github.com/egirault/googleplay-api.
[15] hpHosts. http://www.hosts-file.net.
[16] Malware Domain Hosts Lists.
https://www.malwaredomainlist.com/hostslist/hosts.txt.
[17] MVPS Hosts Lists. http://winhelp2002.mvps.org/hosts.txt.
[18] Raccon APK Downloader. http://www.onyxbits.de/raccoon.
[19] SomeOneCare Hosts Lists. http://someonewhocares.org/hosts/
hosts.
[20] Steven Black Hosts. https://github.com/StevenBlack/hosts.
[21] YoYo Ad Server List. https://pgl.yoyo.org/adservers/.
[22] K. W. Y. Au, Y. F. Zhou, Z. Huang, and D. Lie. PScout:
Analyzing the Android Permission Specification. In CCS, 2012.
[23] A. Bose, X. Hu, K. G. Shin, and T. Park. Behavioral Detection
of Malware on Mobile Handsets. In ACM MobiSys, 2008.
[24] W. Enck, P. Gilbert, B.-G. Chun, L. P. Cox, J. Jung, P. Mc-
Daniel, and A. N. Sheth. TaintDroid: An Information Flow
Tracking System for Real-Time Privacy Monitoring on Smart-
phones. CACM, 2014.
[25] S. Englehardt and A. Narayanan. Online Tracking: A 1-million-
site Measurement and Analysis . In CCS, 2016.
[26] M. Ikram, H. J. Asghar, M. A. Kaafar, B. Krishnamurthy, and
A. Mahanti. Towards seamless tracking-free web: Improved
detection of trackers via one-class learning. PETS, 2017.
[27] M. Ikram, N. V. Rodriguez, S. Seneviratne, D. Kaafar, and
V. Paxson. An analysis of the privacy and security risks of
android VPN permission-enabled apps. In ACM IMC, 2016.
[28] J. Jeon, K. K. Micinski, J. A. Vaughan, A. Fogel, N. Reddy,
J. S. Foster, and T. Millstein. Dr. Android and Mr. Hide: Fine-
grained Permissions in Android Applications. In ACM SPSM,
2012.
[29] A. Lerner, A. K. Simpson, T. Kohno, and F. Roesner. Internet
jones and the raiders of the lost trackers: An archaeological
study of web tracking from 1996 to 2016. In USENIX Sec.,
2016.
[30] S. Seneviratne, H. Kolamunna, and A. Seneviratne. A Measure-
ment Study of Tracking in Paid Mobile Applications. In ACM
WiSec, 2015.
[31] N. Wang, B. Zhang, B. Liu, and H. Jin. Mobilehci. 2015.
[32] C. E. Wills and D. C. Uzunoglu. What ad blockers are (and are
not) doing. In HotWeb, 2016.
# Title App ID Category Rating Price Class Installs
1 Opera browser - news & search com.opera.browser Comm. 4.34 Free Browser 100M
2 Opera Mini - fast web browser com.opera.mini.native Comm. 4.37 Free Browser 100M
3 UC Browser - Fast Download com.UCMobile.intl Comm. 4.49 Free Browser 100M
4 Firefox Browser fast & private org.mozilla.firefox Comm. 4.38 Free Browser 100M
5 CM Browser - Fast & Light com.ksmobile.cb Comm. 4.54 Free Browser 50M
6 Dolphin - Best Web Browser mobi.mgeek.TunnyBrowser Comm. 4.53 Free Browser 50M
7 Photon Flash Player & Browser com.appsverse.photon Comm. 3.73 Free Browser 10M
8 DU Browser—Browse fast & fun com.baidu.browser.inter Comm. 4.32 Free Browser 10M
9 Dolphin Browser Express: News com.dolphin.browser.express.web Comm. 4.1 Free Browser 10M
10 Maxthon Web Browser com.mx.browser Comm. 4.44 Free Browser 10M
11 Yandex Browser for Android com.yandex.browser Comm. 4.47 Free Browser 10M
12 Best VPN - Free Unlimited VPN com.northghost.touchvpn Tools 4.39 Free VPN 5M
13 APUS Browser - Fast Download com.apusapps.browser Person. 4.48 Free Browser 5M
14 Opera browser beta com.opera.browser.beta Comm. 4.25 Free Browser 5M
15 Adblock Browser for Android org.adblockplus.browser Comm. 4.08 Free Browser 5M
16 F-Secure Freedome VPN com.fsecure.freedome.vpn.security.privacy.android Tools 4.29 Free VPN 1M
17 Opera Free VPN - Unlimited VPN com.opera.vpn Tools 4.35 Free VPN 1M
18 Dolphin Browser (JP) com.dolphin.browser.android.jp Comm. 4.15 Free Browser 1M
19 Dolphin Jetpack - Fast & Flash com.dolphin.browser.engine Comm. 4.15 Free Browser 1M
20 Dolphin Zero Incognito Browser com.dolphin.browser.zero Social 4.2 Free Browser 1M
21 Free Adblocker Browser com.hsv.freeadblockerbrowser Comm. 4.39 Free Browser 1M
22 Speed Booster for Android mobi.mgeek.browserfaster Social 4.17 Free Browser 1M
23 Lightning Web Browser acr.browser.barebones Comm. 4.15 Free Browser 500K
24 Ghostery Privacy Browser com.ghostery.android.ghostery Comm. 4.13 Free Browser 500K
25 Mercury Browser for Android com.ilegendsoft.mercury Prod. 4.29 Free Browser 500K
26 Link Bubble com.linkbubble.playstore Person. 4.18 Free Browser 500K
27 Sleipnir Mobile - Web Browser jp.co.fenrir.android.sleipnir Comm. 3.89 Free Browser 500K
28 Adblock Plus (Samsung Browser) org.adblockplus.adblockplussbrowser Comm. 3.89 Free Browser 500K
29 Dash VPN com.actmobile.dashvpn Busin. 4.03 Free VPN 100K
30 NetGuard - no-root firewall eu.faircode.netguard Tools 4.24 Free VPN 100K
31 Adblock Browser adblock.browser.lightning Prod. 3.73 Free Browser 100K
32 Emo Ads Blocker Browser ads.blocker.browser Tools 3.38 Free Browser 100K
33 Adguard Content Blocker com.adguard.android.contentblocker Tools 4.06 Free Browser 100K
34 APUS Browser Turbo com.apusapps.browser.turbo Person. 4.23 Free Browser 100K
35 AdBlock for Samsung Internet com.betafish.adblocksbrowser Prod. 3.64 Free Browser 100K
36 Hermit • Lite Apps Browser com.chimbori.hermitcrab Tools 4.51 Free Browser 100K
37 CLIQZ Browser + Search Engine com.cliqz.browser Comm. 4.04 Free Browser 100K
38 Anonymous Private Sec Browser com.evda.connecttor Comm. 3.88 Free Browser 100K
39 Flyperlink com.flyperinc.flyperlink Prod. 4.15 Free Browser 100K
40 Jet Browser com.jet.browser Comm. 4.08 Free Browser 100K
41 Browser com.mmbox.browser Comm. 4.49 Free Browser 100K
42 X Browser com.mmbox.xbrowser.gp Tools 4.36 Free Browser 100K
43 X Browser Super Fast & mini com.mmbox.xbrowser.pro Tools 4.25 Free Browser 100K
44 WebGuard com.mobisoft.webguard Tools 4.54 Free Browser 100K
45 Adblock Fast com.rocketshipapps.adblockfast Prod. 3.87 Free Browser 100K
46 Swift Browser dotc.mobi.swift.browser Comm. 4.3 Free Browser 100K
47 3G - 4G Fast Internet Browser jad.fast.internet.browser Prod. 4.12 Free Browser 100K
48 AC Browser net.ac.browser Comm. 4.53 Free Browser 100K
49 Rocket Browser net.rocket.browser Comm. 4.44 Free Browser 100K
50 Fast Browser experience sairam.simplebrowser Comm. 4.14 Free Browser 100K
51 Aon Browser tr.abak.simsekTarayici Comm. 4 Free Browser 100K
52 LostNet NoRoot Firewall com.lostnet.fw.free Prod. 4.38 Free VPN 50K
53 Secure Wireless me.disconnect.securefi Tools 4.02 Free VPN 50K
54 Dee Browser co.zew.deebrowser Comm. 4.14 Free Browser 50K
55 Adskip Browser com.adsbrower Tools 3.95 Free Browser 50K
56 Javelin Incognito Browser com.jerky.browser2 Prod. 4.03 Free Browser 50K
57 팀버 애드필터 (Adfilter) com.mobligation.timberadblock Prod. 3.62 Free Browser 50K
58 팀버 브라우저 (Timber browser) com.mobligation.timberbrowser Prod. 4.75 Free Browser 50K
59 YuBrowser - Fast, Filters Ads com.mokee.yubrowser Comm. 4.1 Free Browser 50K
60 Slimperience Browser (AdBlock) com.saschaha.browser Comm. 4.14 Free Browser 50K
61 Zirco Browser org.zirco Comm. 3.78 Free Browser 50K
62 Dash Net Accelerated VPN com.actmobile.dashnet Travl. 3.95 Free VPN 10K
63 Adskip — for data control com.play.adskip Tools 2.23 Free VPN 10K
64 Lightning Web Browser + acr.browser.lightning Comm. 4.32 1.50$ Browser 10K
65 AdBlocker Lite Browser adblocker.lite.browser Comm. 3.66 Free Browser 10K
66 Crystal Adblock for Samsung co.crystalapp.crystal Prod. 4.05 Free Browser 10K
67 Secure Browser + Adblocker com.browser.securebrowser Prod. 3.97 Free Browser 10K
68 jioweb 4g browser com.oorweb.uc.Activity Comm. 3.93 Free Browser 10K
69 Firebird Browser - Super Fast com.prbstudios.firebird Comm. 3.98 Free Browser 10K
70 Clean Page - Adblocker Browser com.tako.android.cleanpage Comm. 3.29 Free Browser 10K
71 No Ad Internet Browser jad.internet.browser.block Tools 2.59 Free Browser 10K
72 Unicorn Adblocker kr.co.lylstudio.unicorn Prod. 4.4 2.14$ Browser 10K
73 Trim Browser - Fast & Secure trim.altict.com Comm. 4.12 Free Browser 10K
74 PowerDownloads zerolab.android.pdown Video. 4.36 Free Browser 10K
75 sFly Network Booster com.cdnren.sfly Tools 4.1 Free VPN 5K
76 AdTrap Mobile com.bluepointsecurity.adtrapaurora Comm. 3.07 Free Browser 5K
77 LostNet NoRoot Firewall Pro com.lostnet.fw.pro Prod. 4.15 0.99$ VPN 1K
78 MiniBrowser PRO com.dmkho.mbm Comm. 4.28 1.50$ Browser 1K
79 Simple FLV with Adblock com.titlisapp.simpleflv Video. 4.52 Free Browser 1K
80 Deep Search Browser com.wDeepSeacrhBrowser Prod. 2.75 Free Browser 1K
81 Faster Browser Ever com.wFastWebbrowserFree Comm. 4.09 Free Browser 1K
82 Supreme - Web Browser es.soguezvm.supreme Comm. 3.94 Free Browser 1K
83 MSK Browser gl.msk.bro Comm. 4.24 Free Browser 1K
84 Snap Browser io.snapbrowser.lite Comm. 3.58 Free Browser 1K
85 Piggy browser jp.myumyu.piggybrowser Comm. 3.62 Free Browser 1K
86 speed browser siy.browser Comm. 4.1 Free Browser 1K
87 Krypton Browser co.kr36.krypton.r Comm. 4.01 2.56$ Browser 1K
88 AndGuard for Root soapbox.sym3try.andguard Tools 3.85 1.95$ VPN 500
89 AndGuard Pro (w/ Iptables) soapbox.sym3try.andguardpro Tools 4.17 2.93$ VPN 500
90 Web Cleaner com.chisstech.android2 Tools 4 Free VPN 100
91 Fast Speed Internet Browser com.kubopirez.fast.speed.internet.browser Tools 3.75 Free Browser 100
92 FastCat com.wFastCat Entert. 3.67 Free Browser 100
93 Magneto browser com.wMagnetobrowser Comm. 3.94 Free Browser 100
94 Zeebrow com.zohib.browser Comm. 3 Free Browser 100
95 Snap Browser Pro io.snapbrowser.pro Comm. 4.1 1.58$ Browser 100
96 Browser Incognito - Supreme es.soguezvm.incognito Comm. 5 3.12$ Browser 50
97 Supreme Pro - Web Browser es.soguezvm.multi navegador pro Comm. 3.8 1.50$ Browser 50
TABLE IX: List of analyzed Android Adblocking apps with metadata as of December 20, 2016, on Google Play Store.
